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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study public and secret reserve prices in auctions with endogenous entry.
• Seller’s risk aversion raises the public reserve price, rP , above the seller’s cost, c , but lowers the secret reserve price, rS , below the revenue maximizing
reserve, r0.
• Further, rP < rS .
• Hence, for a risk averse seller, reserve prices are ordered: c < rP < rS < r0.
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a b s t r a c t
We show that risk aversion raises the public reserve price rP above the seller’s cost c , but lowers the secret
reserve price rS below the revenue maximizing reserve price r0. Further, rP < rS . Hence, for a risk averse
seller, public and secret reserve prices are ordered: c < rP < rS < r0.1. Introduction
Auction theory typically assumes that the seller is risk neutral.
There are two good reasons for this assumption: First, sellers
are often firms or government agencies whose objective is to
maximize revenue. Second, risk neutrality facilitates the use
of powerful methods from the mechanism design literature
to characterize the optimal auction. The rise of the internet,
however, has led to widespread consumer-to-consumer auctions
on websites such as eBay. In these auctions, sellers are likely to
be risk averse. Furthermore, the number of bidders is determined
endogenously.
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk
averse sellers in second price auctions in which buyers simulta-
neously choose whether to enter the auction. Entering the auction
∗ Corresponding author. Fax: +34 916 249 329.
E-mail address: diego.moreno@uc3m.es (D. Moreno).entails an entry cost, which we assume is the same for all buyers. A
buyer who enters the auction observes her value for the object and
then bids. The entry cost may be interpreted as the buyer’s cost of
learning his value for the item at auction. Buyers’ values are pri-
vate, and independently and identically distributed.
When the reserve price is public, that is, observed by buyers
prior to making their entry decisions, the seller must take account
of how the reserve price influences the buyers’ entry decisions.
Classic papers byMcAfee andMcMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith
(1994) established that with a homogeneous entry costs, a reserve
price equal to the seller’s cost, c , is optimal for a risk neutral seller.
We show that an optimal public reserve price for a risk averse
seller, rP , is above his cost, i.e., c < rP .
When the reserve price is secret, the seller’s choice of reserve
price and buyers’ entry decisions are effectively simultaneous.
Hence the equilibrium reserve price maximizes the sellers’ payoff
given the bidders’ entry decisions. For auctions with a fixed
number of bidders, Hu et al. (2010) established that the optimal
reserve price is independent of the number of bidders, and is1
smaller the more absolutely risk averse is the seller. An immediate
implication of this result in our setting is that the secret reserve rS
is independent of the bidders’ entry decisions, and is smaller the
more absolutely risk averse is the seller. In particular, when the
seller is risk averse the secret reserve price is below the revenue
maximizing reserve price r0, i.e., rS < r0.
Taken together, these results establish that risk aversion has
opposing effects on the optimal public and secret reserve prices:
it raises public reserve prices, but lowers secret reserve prices. In
addition, we show that if the seller is risk averse, an optimal public
reserve price is smaller than the secret reserve price, i.e., rP < rS .
Hence, for a risk averse seller, public and secret reserve prices are
ordered: c < rP < rS < r0.
2. Model
A single item is allocated using a second-price sealed-bid
auction with a reserve price. There are N ≥ 2 risk-neutral
buyers who simultaneously decide whether to enter the auction.
(While risk attitudes do not influence bids in a second price
auction, they affect payoffs to entering the auction.) Entering the
auction entails a cost e > 0. Upon entering the auction, a buyer
observes her value and then bids. Buyers’ values are independently
and identically distributed on an interval [0, ω] according to a
distribution function F with continuous density f , and increasing
hazard rate λ(x) = f (x)/[1 − F(x)]. The seller’s cost of providing
the item is c ∈ [0, ω).
Assuming that bidders follow their dominant strategy of
bidding their value, if n ≥ 1 bidders enter the auction and the
reserve price is r ∈ [c, ω], then the payoff to an entering bidder
is
U(r, n) =
 ω
r
 y
r
F(x)n−1dx

f (y)dy.
Clearly U is decreasing in r and n.
If all buyers enter the auction with the same probability p, the
number of bidders in the auction follows a binomial distribution
B(N, p). Denote by pNn (p) the binomial probability that there are
exactly n ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,N} bidders in the auction. The expected
payoff of a buyer who enters the auction when every other buyer
enters the auction with probability p is U(r, p)− e, where
U(r, p) =
N−1
n=0
pN−1n (p)U(r, n+ 1).
Since U is decreasing in r so is U. And since U(r, n) is decreasing
in n, and for p′′ > p′ the binomial distribution B(N − 1, p′′) first
order stochastically dominates B(N − 1, p′), U is decreasing in p.
The payoff of a buyer who does not enter the auction is zero.
In a symmetric equilibriumof the entry game, each buyer enters
the auction with a probability p∗ that solves the problem
max
p∈[0,1]
p(U(r, p∗)− e). (1)
Since U is decreasing in p, then p∗ = 1 whenever U(r, 1) ≥ e, and
p∗ = 0 whenever U(r, 0) ≤ e, whereas p∗ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique
solution to the equation
U(r, p)− e = 0
otherwise. Denote by ρ(r) the unique solution to (1). It is easy to
see that ρ ′(r) < 0 whenever ρ(r) ∈ (0, 1).
In order to rule out trivial cases where there is no entry or
buyers enter with probability one, we assume that
U(c, 1) < e < U(c, 0).
Thus, ρ(r) < 1 for r ∈ [c, ω], and ρ(r) > 0 for r near c.Denote by v : R → R the von Neumann–Morgenstern
utility function representing the seller’s preferences. We assume
that v is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave,
and normalize v so that v(0) = 0 and v′(0) = 1. Thus,
the utility function of a risk-neutral seller is v(x) = x. The
seller’s Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is R(x) :=
−v′′(x)/v′(x). Hence R(x) ≡ 0 when the seller is risk neutral.
In an auction with a reserve price r ∈ [c, ω] and n bidders, the
seller’s expected utility is V (r, 0) = 0, and for n ≥ 1 it is
V (r, n) = n(1− F(r))F(r)n−1v(r − c)
+
 ω
r
v(x− c)dG(n)2 (x), (2)
where G(n)2 the c.d.f. of the second highest value. Clearly V (r, n) is
increasing in n. If the seller is risk neutral, then (2) identifies seller
profit, which we write as π(r, n).
The seller’s expectedutilitywhen all buyers enterwith the same
probability p is
V(r, p) =
N
n=0
pNn (p)V (r, n). (3)
Since V (r, n) is increasing in n and B(N, p′′) first order stochasti-
cally dominates B(N, p′) for p′′ > p′, then V(r, p) is increasing in
p. If the seller is risk neutral, (3) identifies seller profit when the
reserve price is r and each bidder enters with probability p, which
we write asΠ(r, p).
3. Results
The reserve price is publicwhen it is observed by buyers prior to
making entry decisions. In this scenario, the seller and buyers face
a dynamic game in which the seller first chooses the reserve price
r ∈ [c, ω], and then buyers, upon observing r , simultaneously
choose whether to enter. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria
in which buyers follow symmetric strategies. In a subgame perfect
equilibrium bidders enter according to ρ, and the public reserve
price solves the problem
max
r∈[c,ω]
V(r, ρ(r)).
We say that r is an optimal public reserve price if (r, ρ) is a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the auction.
A direct implication of Levin and Smith’s (1994) Proposition 6 is
that if the seller is risk neutral, then there is a unique optimal public
reserve price, which is equal to the seller’s cost, c.
Proposition 1 establishes that a risk averse seller sets a reserve
price greater than a risk neutral seller. As its proof shows, a
marginal increase of the reserve price above c has two effects on
the seller’s expected utility: holding the entry probability fixed, it
raises the seller’s expected utility by the same amountwhether the
seller is risk neutral or risk averse; and by reducing entry, it lowers
the seller’s expected utility by a larger amount when the seller is
risk neutral than when he is risk averse. Since the expected utility
of the risk neutral seller is maximized at r = c , the total effect is
zero for the risk neutral seller, but is positive for the risk averse
seller.
Proposition 1. If the seller is risk averse, then an optimal public
reserve price rP satisfies rP > c.2
Proof. Differentiating (3) we may write
dV(r, ρ(r))
dr

r=c
− dΠ(r, ρ(r))
dr

r=c
= ρ ′(c)
N
n=0
dpNn (p)
dp
[V (c, n)− π(c, n)]
+
N
n=0
pNn (ρ(c))

∂V (r, n)
∂r

r=c
− ∂π(r, n)
∂r

r=c

. (4)
Since v(0) = 0 and v′(0) = 1, differentiating Eq. (2) yields
∂V (r, n)
∂r

r=c
= n(1− F(c))F(c)n−1,
which is independent of the seller’s utility function v. Therefore the
second term in (4) is zero. As for the first term, we have
V (c, n)− π(c, n) = −
 ω
c
[x− c − v(x− c)]dG(n)2 (x)
= −
 ω
0
Θ(x)dG(n)2 (x),
where Θ(x) := 0 for x ≤ c , and Θ(x) := x − c − v(x − c) for
x > c. Thus, Θ ′(x) = 0 for x ≤ c and Θ ′(x) = 1 − v′(x − c) > 0
for x > c (because v′(0) = 1 and v is concave), and therefore
Θ is increasing. Furthermore, since G(n+1)2 (x) first order stochastic
dominates G(n)2 (x), V (c, n) − π(c, n) is decreasing in n. Thus,
since the binomial distribution B(N, p′′) first order stochastically
dominates B(N, p′), whenever p′′ > p′, and V (c, n) − π(c, n) is
decreasing in n, we have
N
n=0
pNn (p)[V (c, n)− π(c, n)]
is decreasing in p. Since ρ ′(c) < 0, andΠ(r, ρ(r)) is maximized at
r = c , i.e., dΠ(r, ρ(r))/dr|r=c = 0, then
dV(r, ρ(r))
dr

r=c
= ρ ′(c)
N
n=0
dpNn (p)
dp
[V (c, n)− π(c, n)] > 0,
which establishes the proposition. 
The reserve price is secret when it is observed by buyers only
upon entering the auction, and is therefore unknown to the buyers
when making entry decisions. In this scenario, the seller and
buyers face a static game. A Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair
(rS, pS) ∈ [c, ω] × [0, 1] such that rS solves the problem
max
r∈[c,ω]
V(r, pS),
and pS solves the problem
max
p∈[0,1]
p(U(rS, pS)− e).
Thus, if (rS, pS) is a Nash equilibrium, then pS = ρ(rS).
There are always trivial no-entry Nash equilibria in which the
reserve price is high and buyers do not enter: a high reserve price
is optimal when buyers enter with probability zero, and entering
with probability zero is optimal when the reserve price is high.
However, we focus on the (trembling hand) perfect equilibria, in
which the reserve price is optimal for the seller when buyers enter
with a vanishingly small probability.
By Proposition 5 in Hu et al. (2010), in a second price sealed-
bid auction with n ≥ 2 bidders, the unique reserve price thatmaximizes the seller’s expected utility, V (·, n), is the solution of
the equation
Φ(r) := 1
λ(r)
− v(r − c)
v′(r − c) = 0, (5)
which is independent of n. Hence, for any p > 0, the reserve price
that uniquely maximizes V(·, p) is the solution to Eq. (5). Moreover,
by Theorem 2 in Hu et al. (2010), this reserve price is smaller the
more absolute risk averse is the seller. Noting that these results
holdwhen n = 1 aswell, Proposition 2 describes their implications
for auctions with endogenous entry in which the reserve price is
secret.
Proposition 2. When the reserve price is secret, there is a unique
perfect equilibrium. In this equilibrium the reserve price rS , which is
the solution to Eq. (5), is independent of the number of buyers N, and
is smaller the more absolute risk averse is the seller.
When the seller is risk neutral, the equilibrium secret reserve
r0 is the solution to the equation r = c + 1/λ(r); hence r0 > c.
Our theorem below describes the effects of seller risk aversion in
auctions with public and secret reserve prices. Risk aversion has
opposite effects when the reserve is public and when it is secret: it
raises optimal public reserve prices above c , but lowers the secret
reserve below r0.
Theorem. If the seller is risk averse, then an optimal public reserve
price is below the secret reserve price, and hence c < rP < rS < r0.
Proof. Let rP be any optimal public reserve price. First, we show
that rP ≤ rS . Let r > rS . Since rS uniquely maximizes V (·, n)
for all n ≥ 1 (see the proof of Proposition 5 in Hu et al., 2010),
then V (r, n) < V (rS, n) for all n ≥ 1. Hence V(r, ρ(r)) <
V(rS, ρ(r)). Also, since ρ is decreasing, the binomial B(N, ρ(rS))
first order stochastically dominates B(N, ρ(r)); thenV(rS, ρ(r)) ≤
V(rS, ρ(rS)). Therefore V(r, ρ(r)) < V(rS, ρ(rS)), and hence rP ≤
rS .
Now we show that rP ≠ rS . Since ρ(r) > 0, and therefore
V(r, ρ(r)) > 0, for r near c , then ρ(rP) > 0. Hence rP < rS
whenever ρ(rS) = 0. Suppose that ρ(rS) > 0. Then ρ ′(rS) < 0.
Differentiating Eq. (3) yields
dV(r, ρ(r))
dr
= ∂V(r, p)
∂r
+ ∂V(r, p)
∂p
ρ ′(r).
Again, since rS uniquely maximizes V (·, n), we have
∂V(r, p)
∂r

r=rS
=
N
n=0
pNn (p)
∂V (r, n)
∂r

r=rS
= 0.
Further, ∂V(r, p)/∂p > 0 and ρ ′(rS) < 0 imply
∂V(r, p)
∂p

r=rS
ρ ′(rS) < 0.
Hence
dV(r, ρ(r))
dr

r=rS
< 0,
and therefore rP ≠ rS .
Since c < rP by Proposition 1, and rS < r0 by Proposition 2, then
c < rP < rS < r0. 
An implication of our theorem is that profit is maximal when the
reserve price is public and the seller is risk neutral.3
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